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ABSTRACT 
The increased reliance on advanced networking technologies to integrate cutting-
edge capabilities has posed tremendous challenges in assuring user legitimacy 
and preserving the integrity of our network landscape. Without proper network 
accountability and holistic vulnerability assessment, insider threats can exploit 
the security vulnerabilities that result from creating an integrated system-of-
systems. To detect security illegitimacies, such as unauthorized connections, 
network security administrators need to have a comprehensive network map to 
identify potential entry points.  
This thesis proposes a systematic way to combine “black-box” and “white-
box” analysis for network exploration and vulnerability assessment. In the 
analytical model design, a modular approach is adopted to select tools and 
techniques from both analysis approaches. These tools and techniques are used 
to construct a network map based on a pre-defined set of criteria that define the 
type of essential network information to be annotated on the map. The “black-
box” and “white-box” analysis approaches were found to be complementary. For 
example, “black-box” analysis was able to map active hosts and networking 
devices, but “white-box” analysis was able to detect those that are inactive or do 
not respond to pings. Moreover, “black-box” analysis provides a focal point for 
“white-box” analysis approach to derive in-depth information regarding 
unauthorized connections.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The impact of cyberspace on the commercial and financial sectors 
influenced military operations to increase their capitalization of advanced 
networking technologies and, thereby, reap key benefits of information 
technology. In June 2009, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates issued a memorandum 
to establish the U.S. Cyber Command for military cyberspace operations and 
asserted that cyberspace will become a dominant enabler in military operations. 
Cyberspace and its associated technologies offer unprecedented 
opportunities to the United States and are vital to our Nation’s 
security and, by extension, to all aspects of military operations. Yet 
our increasing dependency on cyberspace, alongside a growing 
array of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, adds a new element of 
risk to our national security. [1]     
The developments of war-fighting concepts have evolved from platform-
centric development to network-centric force development. They focus on 
creating integrated sensor-shooter capabilities and fighting as an integrated, 
networked force. Key enabling networking technologies, such as Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), Web services, and network devices, 
like routers, steered the stove-piped posture of operational systems to a tightly 
integrated global computing ecosystem. 
Integrating stove-piped and proprietary legacy systems was a challenging 
up-hill task, let alone integrating it with new systems. Introduction of new 
architectural framework to define and deliver net-centric capability from legacy 
military systems [2] and software technologies such as the Net-Centric Adapter 
for Legacy Systems (NCALS) [3] was necessary. It was relatively easy to assess 
the security of systems individually, and account for the supporting network 
devices to identify potential entry points into the network. However, it becomes 
more challenging to assess the overall security posture when these systems are 
integrated.  Accountability of the enabling network devices became time-
consuming as the network landscape grew exponentially when large networks 
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are integrated. Furthermore, the security challenges increase dramatically when 
individual networked systems are integrated with other networked systems to 
form a larger system-of-systems. Introduction of new interdependent 
vulnerabilities is possible and requires a holistic vulnerability assessment to 
mitigate them. 
Authenticating the legitimacy of network devices and preserving the 
integrity of the network landscape is paramount because it is the key enabler for 
our critical operational capabilities. This involves accounting for every key 
networking device that enable the close integration of systems to detect 
illegitimate host or router connections made possible by insider threats [4]. 
Insider threats may connect unauthorized computer systems or routers to 
publicly accessible switch ports and establish authorized connections, which they 
may launch attacks or accidentally leak sensitive information out from the closed 
network. Traditionally, vulnerability assessments or penetration testing can reveal 
potential entry points on networks. As the network landscape grows continually 
with more integration of large system-of-systems, there is a need for a holistic 
vulnerability assessment to identify vulnerabilities at the system level. It should 
be comprised of a comprehensive suite of vulnerability assessment techniques 
and tools that are able to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessment when 
these system-of-systems are integrated. This will minimize the security risks of 
insider threats exploiting these entry points as a venue for their attacks on the 
network. Proper network accountability will eventually prevent the escalation of 
such attacks because clusters of compromised computer networks can be more 
responsively isolated and recovered. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
Current discovery techniques, including human knowledge and physical 
inspection [5], are encouraged for network exploration, but it has proved to be 
time-consuming and faced tremendous challenges in updating the database.  
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There is a need for an efficient way to aid the network security administrators in 
addressing the issue of network accountability as part of vulnerability 
assessment. 
An integrated approach is adapted in this thesis to propose a way to 
address the issue of proper network accountability and comprehensive 
assessment. It leverages on the strengths of the “black-box” analysis approach to 
address the challenges in accounting networking devices in an unknown, 
composite system-of-systems environment, and the comprehensiveness of a 
“White-box” analysis approach to advance our knowledge of our existing 
component networks. By mapping the entire system-of-systems into a network 
map, the map will provide a complete picture for the conduct of a holistic 
vulnerability assessment at the system level.  
The thesis intends to develop an analytical model to produce a more 
comprehensive network map with which holistic vulnerability assessment is made 
to detect unauthorized host and router connections that are connected via 
publicly accessible switch ports. It will pave the way for the future development of 
an application program to perform comprehensive network exploration and 
vulnerability assessment for large, unknown or poorly documented systems-of-
systems. This research will assist the network security administrators to better 
understand the risks of insider threats, so that they can develop more responsive 
security policies and measures to recover compromised systems.  
B. BENEFITS OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
The “Black-box” approaches that were adapted involve understanding the 
behavior, capabilities and limitations of current network mapping techniques, 
such as Network Mapper (Nmap) [6] and Nessus [7]. Because such techniques 
do not require prior knowledge of a system-of-systems and its supporting 
networks, they were useful for mapping the current network state at which 
network devices are connected. 
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“Black-box” analysis techniques can aid determining what hosts are 
available on the network, the services these hosts are offering, the types of 
operating systems they are running, and other characteristics that are useful for 
identifying a host or a network device. However, this approach has its limitations 
because there is no way by itself to validate the completeness of its assessment 
or determining what it has not discovered. By contrast, a “white-box” analysis 
approach starts with some knowledge of the characteristics of the system-of-
systems. However, this knowledge can become outdated as large system-of-
systems are integrated at a fast-paced system integration cycle that strives to 
meet functionalities of critical mission requirements.  
The key benefits in combining the “black-box” analysis approach with the 
“white-box” analysis approach were two fold (1) the two approaches complement 
each other’s strengths and limitations to conduct network exploration and 
vulnerability assessment, and (2) it proposes a systematic way to combine 
“black-box” and “white-box” analysis approaches.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The primary research question that this thesis endeavors to answer is 
“What will the integrated approach of combining “black-box” and “white-box” 
analysis entail to discover unauthorized host and router connections?” Other 
subordinate issues include: 
a. What are the limitations in current network exploration and 
vulnerability assessment techniques for an unknown system-of-systems? 
b. How many more network vulnerabilities can we discover combining 
“black-box” and “white-box” analysis approaches? 
c. What are the parameters used to ascertain that there are 
unauthorized host and router connections in the system-of-systems? 
d. What are the benefits of adopting this integrated approach for 
mapping an unknown system-of-systems?  
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D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter II provides an overview of the current network exploration and 
vulnerability assessments techniques used in the “black-box” and “white-box” 
analysis approaches. It discusses the limitations of employing these approaches 
to conduct network exploration and vulnerability assessment. 
Chapter III presents the integrated approach of combining “black-box” and 
“white-box” analysis approaches, and compares its impact on network 
exploration and vulnerability assessment with current techniques.  
Chapter IV covers the analytical model for discovering unauthorized host 
and router connections, using the proposed integrated approach.  
Chapter V summarizes the thesis efforts and provides recommendations 
for follow-up research, specifically in the development of an application program 
that automatically conducts network exploration and vulnerability assessment 
using the proposed integrated approach. 
 6
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II. BACKGROUND  
A.  PROLOGUE 
This chapter provides a quick overview of the key developments in 
network exploration and vulnerability assessment for a large integrated system-
of-systems. The focus of this literature review is on current tools and techniques 
in three sections, namely: network exploration, detection of unauthorized 
connections by insider threats, and vulnerability assessment, as depicted in 
Figure 1. There are tools and techniques that are currently used to map known 
and unknown (also commonly known as vulnerabilities subjected to Zero-day 
attacks) vulnerabilities, in relation to the networked environment. 
 
Figure 1.   Focus Areas of Literature Review 
In mapping unknown environments and validating the integrity of known 
ones, this review discusses the scope and capabilities of these known 
techniques. With specific scenarios crafted to model the problem of detecting 
unauthorized connections made by insider threats, current network monitoring 
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and intrusion detection techniques are also reviewed to understand what they 
can or cannot detect. System vulnerabilities resulting from integrating large 
networked systems is an emerging security issue and there are related research 
efforts that will aid in modeling the integrated approach in this thesis.    
B. “BLACK-BOX” ANALYSIS VERSUS “WHITE-BOX” ANALYSIS 
“Black-box” analysis refers to analyzing an unknown network topology by 
probing it with various input data packets to elicit responses from hosts that are 
operating on the network (also known as “live” hosts). From the hacker’s 
perspective, this is similar to a commonly known process called Network 
Reconnaissance or Fingerprinting, whereby tools such as Nmap, and Xprobe2 
[8] are used to generate a list of vulnerable targets for the hacker to plan his 
attack. The target list will consist of a network map that details vulnerable hosts 
and networking devices, as well as their network information such as IP 
addresses and operating system versions. “Black-box” analysis is easier to 
perform because it does not require as much expertise as compared to “white-
box” analysis. In terms of obtaining knowledge from the network, it is not as 
effective as “white-box” analysis because it heavily relies on the responses it 
received from running hosts and networking devices.  
On the other hand, “white-box” analysis refers to analyzing and validating 
the status and inventory of a known network environment. It is usually associated 
with Network Management and Monitoring tools such as LANsurveyor [9] that 
help the network administrators maintain the integrity of the network. Other 
“white-box” analysis techniques include detailed examination of configuration 
files and states of the edge networking devices such as routers and switches. In 
terms of obtaining knowledge for completeness, this approach is very effective 
because it deals with known network environments and network information is 
readily accessible. The main drawback in the “white-box” analysis approach is 
the relatively high false positive rates as compared to “black-box” analysis. By 
virtue that the scope of the network is large and it takes time to ensure network 
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integrity (such as disseminating the latest security patches) and ensure inventory 
accountability, network information can get outdated frequently as the network 
environment is periodically evolving. 
C. CURRENT NETWORK EXPLORATION TECHNIQUES  
Advanced militaries continue to leverage networking technologies and 
integrate networked systems-of-systems at a fast-paced development cycle, and 
this poses great challenges for the network administrators and security managers 
to keep pace and grasp the overall network architecture and system 
vulnerabilities in a constantly changing security landscape. The “fog of war” has 
increased in the cyberspace domain and extended beyond the scope of network 
mapping. Traditionally, network mapping is a technique associated with a hacker 
attempting to determine the hosts or services available in a target network. This 
will allow him to determine the host that is the weakest link, offering a gateway to 
launch his attack into the network. From the network monitoring perspective, a 
network administrator will need to have comprehensive network topology 
information at hand to determine the availability and security status of his 
network, to respond quickly to incidents that vary from system failures to cyber 
attacks. This information will also aid in the Information Technology (IT) audit 
process. 
Network Exploration is a term adapted for this thesis to represent the 
process of gaining knowledge about the defended network in order to assure 
network integrity in the presence of hostile actions. It works on the assumption 
that there is zero knowledge about the target system-of-systems and 
subsequently employing a systematic approach to explore and map out all 
computers and networking devices. Unlike network mapping from the perspective 
of a hacker, network exploration does not primarily focus on vulnerable systems 
in its network but attempts to map the entire cyberspace that enables critical 
networked operation of the system-of-systems. The network map generated by 
this process will comprise hosts, servers, and networking devices, in both wired 
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and wireless domains, that make up the enabling cyberspace. The techniques 
used to construct network diagrams of an unknown network environment are 
usually in the realms of network reconnaissance and network management and 
monitoring.  
1. Network Reconnaissance 
Network reconnaissance techniques are essential for an attacker to 
determine the vulnerabilities of the network stealthily. They are categorized as 
either active or passive reconnaissance. Passive network reconnaissance 
involves the collection of network information through social engineering and 
publicly available information. However, these techniques are not relevant 
because the nature of our military operational networks is usually confidential 
and not publicly available. Comparatively, active reconnaissance involves 
techniques that generate network traffic to elicit responses from the target 
network. These responses are relatively real-time and more informative in 
generating a detailed network map, which is useful for identifying unauthorized 
host and router connections. The techniques and tools of direct relevance are: 
a. Nmap (Network Mapper) 
The most common network exploration tool for mapping an 
unknown environment is Nmap, as it is designed to scan large networks rapidly. 
Nmap can explore an unknown network by running combinations of multi-port 
scans on several network protocols to determine if there are hosts available on a 
specified Internet Protocol (IP) address. If the hosts do not respond to the data 
packets (or “pings”) sent out by Nmap, it will interpret that no host or network 
device uses the scanned IP addresses. Nmap supports host discovery based on 
the responses it receives. It analyzes them, builds a signature for that host, and 
compares the host’s signature with its database to determine the host’s operating 
system, the services it offers, and other characteristics that can attribute to 
differentiating a host from another network device.  
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b. Xprobe2++ 
The design of Xprobe2++ focused on employing remote network 
scanning on both the network and application layers of an unknown target 
network to build up a host signature based on collected responses. Xprobe2++ is 
able to identify the type and version of the operating system that the detected 
host is using. It is an improvement from its predecessor, Xprobe2, increasing its 
host detection capability via a better signature engine and fuzzy signature 
matching process. Significant enhancements have made the probing capability of 
Xprobe2++ stealthier by minimizing the network traffic overhead of its data 
packets. Its host discovery modules are designed to perform host probing, 
firewall detection, and provide additional information to estimate the actual 
response time and identify packets dropped by the detected host. Comparatively, 
Xprobe2++ proved that it generates less traffic loads than Nmap when no TCP 
port scanning is performed [10]. 
2. Network Management and Monitoring 
Techniques and tools that support network management and monitoring 
are employed on known network environments and primarily focus on 
maintaining network integrity, planning resource and capacity usage, and 
monitoring network performance. Some advanced network management tools 
will provide network-mapping capability and may be used by network 
administrators to track IP addresses, and configure network devices and 
systems. In terms of monitoring performance, network management tools employ 
techniques to determine if optimization is in place for the network’s performance. 
These network-mapping tools include:  
a. LANsurveyor 
LANsurveyor is an automatic network-mapping tool that discovers 
active hosts and network devices from an unknown environment using multi-
discovery techniques. It sends out Simple Network Management Protocol 
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(SNMP) pings and scans to Active Directory Domain Controllers that contain 
information about network services, such as the Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) directory services and DNS-based naming information. 
LANsurveyor is able to monitor the network and dynamically update the network 
map with new devices and unknown systems that are active on the network. 
Upon detection of unknown or rogue connections, LANsurveyor can 
automatically disable the network access for that device. The spanning tree 
support for LANsurveyor enables it to provide accurate mapping of switch-to-
switch connectivity. 
b. IPSonar 
IPSonar is another advanced network-mapping tool that aims at 
providing global visibility of known networks and evaluates security risks from a 
network administrator’s perspective. Its network-mapping capability involves 
mapping every host and network device on a network, including those that are 
currently not under its management. This is to provide visibility of the connectivity 
between hosts/network devices and the underlying supporting networks, so that 
the administrators can analyze the potential security risks and attack patterns. 
IPSonar extends its capability to encompass identification of network bottlenecks 
due to poor configurations and vulnerabilities exploitable by unknown devices.  
D. RELATED WORK IN DETECTING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS 
Research on insider threats spans across wide areas of network security, 
especially in the area of detecting malicious activities by insiders. The common 
solution to combat malicious activities generated by insider threats is the 
employment of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) that examine traffic 
data against its signature database or known heuristics to discern malicious from 
legitimate traffic. It is noticeable that such detection techniques are reactive in 
nature and there exists great challenges in maintaining high accuracies in 
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detecting true malicious traffic in the network [9]. There is a need for a more 
responsive approach in detecting unauthorized connections. 
1. Overview 
In this section, the focus of the literature review is on three specific 
scenarios to illustrate how current detection capabilities address the detection of 
unauthorized host and router connections. The first scenario entails the attacker 
attempting to connect an unauthorized host into one of the readily available 
switch ports (unsecured wall-jack access) and launch his attack on un-patched 
and vulnerable networked systems. In the second, the attacker can extend the 
network coverage to create his/her unauthorized wired and wireless networks 
with which attacks can be coordinated and launched. Finally, the attacker can 
simply connect an unauthorized wireless access point to provide subsequent 
access into a physically hardened network. 
2. Unauthorized Host and Router Connections   
In this first scenario, as illustrated in Figure 2, the attacker simply uses 
readily available switches, or exposed wall-jack connections to switches, located 
in the public access areas to establish an unauthorized host connection.  
 
Figure 2.   Unauthorized Host Connection  
 14
From this unauthorized connection, the attacker will scan for network 
vulnerabilities, and launch a variety of network attacks that range from 
introducing viruses to performing denial of service attacks on vulnerable systems. 
Detection of a new host or router in the network can be achieved by using 
network-monitoring tools that generate network maps, such as LANsurveyor and 
IPSonar. These tools automatically update the network maps if there are 
changes to the network topology, including the unauthorized host and router 
connection. However, these tools cannot determine the malicious activities in 
isolation without any vulnerability assessment capabilities built-in or provided by 
another tool. 
Figure 3 depicts a scenario in which the attacker connects a router and 
sets up his/her own wired and wireless networks. These hosts are likely to 
introduce vulnerabilities to the original network, as they do not meet the security 
requirements. In a worst-case scenario, the attacker may use it to leak sensitive 
or classified information out to the wireless networks and/or as a launch pad to 
coordinate distributed denial-of-service attacks. 
 
Figure 3.   Unauthorized Router Connection 
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3. Unauthorized Wireless Access Point Connections 
As depicted in Figure 4, this is a scenario whereby the attacker connects a 
wireless access point as a legitimate entry point, but it also serve as a malicious 
platform waiting to be exploited for subsequent attacks ranging from network 
inject to denial-of-service attacks. Wireless networks provide high mobility and 
extensibility of Internet access through wireless access points that are radio 
transmitters and receivers. As the transmission of data uses radio frequencies 
that are omni-directional, many research studies have shown that wireless 
access points and wireless networks have inherent vulnerabilities that are 
exploitable by attackers. Thus, the ability to detect unauthorized wireless access 
points in a secured environment is essential to maintaining network security. 
 
Figure 4.   Unauthorized Wireless Access Point 
The detection of unauthorized wireless access points (or more commonly 
known as Rogue Wireless Access Points (RWAPs)) can employ two potential 
architectural options, namely “Over the Air” architecture and “Over the Wire” 
architecture, as described in [10]. The “Over-the-Air” architecture and scanning 
techniques evolved from scanning the network physically to installing permanent 
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listening devices or sensors and instituting portable sensor zones that are 
adjustable based upon recognition of client messages to reduce sensor density, 
and thereby cost and maintenance, while providing the desired detection 
capability. The “Over-the Wire” architecture and detection techniques require 
gathering of network information from cooperation with connected network 
devices, to detect a malicious RWAP. This falls back to our discussion on current 
network exploration techniques that can be used for detecting such devices.  
Other research in this area involves employing different techniques, such 
as the Rouge Identifying Packet Payload Slicer (RIPPS) [11], to improve this 
detection capability. Essentially, this new technique detects RWAPs without 
using wireless sensors or deploying any host-based listening devices. It 
leverages on the combined effectiveness of active network traffic conditioning 
techniques with passive packet timing analysis to enhance the accuracy and 
speed of its detection measurements. 
E. CURRENT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
1. Vulnerability Assessment Tools and Techniques 
There are a vast number of vulnerability assessment tools that focus on 
determining if hosts are patched with the latest security updates, and/or 
misconfigured. However, the review focuses on those that are relevant in 
contributing to assessing large system-of-systems. 
a.  Nessus  
Nessus is a well-known vulnerability assessment tool designed to 
automate the testing and discovery of known security vulnerabilities of a network. 
It has the ability to detect remote flaws, local flaws and missing patches of the 
hosts on the network. The Nessus security scanner uses NASL (Nessus Attack 
Scripting Language) to write its own security tests as a plug-in, thereby the 
administrators need not download untrusted binaries from the Internet. In 
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addition, this tool recognizes services that are run on a non-standard port 
assigned by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The vulnerability 
assessment involves three phases, namely: Scanning, Enumeration and 
Vulnerability Detection. These phases allow Nessus to scan for hosts that are 
operating on the network, determine the services that are run on the host and 
networking devices, and checks for vulnerabilities based on known 
vulnerabilities, such as buffer-overflows and improper configuration etc. 
2. System-level Vulnerability Assessment 
The problem of detecting unauthorized host and router connections 
becomes more complex when collections of independent systems are integrated 
to form a large system-of-systems, and the underlying networks grow non-
linearly due to interconnections between the component systems. In addition, 
such integration processes may generate vulnerabilities that are unknown to 
developers and security engineers from each component systems. Such 
vulnerabilities may be a result of network security conflicts or inheritance of 
unknown system vulnerabilities, as illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.   System-level Vulnerabilities 
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Within a standalone network, security research works [12] highlight the 
daunting task of configuring network security policies to govern network devices. 
The task remains complex and error-prone because of the rule dependency 
semantics and policy interaction in the network. The taxonomy of policy conflicts 
includes intra-policy and inter-policy conflicts. The intra-policy conflicts were 
summarized in the categories highlighted as follows: 
1. Shadowing – A rule is shadowed when data packets match some 
other preceding rules that call for the execution of a very different set of actions, 
instead of the one crafted by the “shadowed” rule. 
2. Correlation – This conflict is created when data packets match two 
rules, and the set of actions to take will be dependent on the ordering of these 
rules, which may not served the intended purpose correctly.  
3. Exception – Conflicts are generated as a result when a matching 
rule is a subset of another rule, where the latter has a different set of actions for 
the data packets.  
4. Redundancy – A rule is redundant when data packets match a rule 
that has similar set of actions as specified by another rule.  
As presented in [12], the Inter-policy conflicts are categorized into two 
areas, namely “shadowing” and “spuriousness.” While shadowing conflicts are 
similar to that described in intra-policy conflicts, conflicts generated in the 
category of “spuriousness” give rise to a situation where data packets are 
permitted by a upstream policy but blocked by a downstream policy.  
System-level vulnerabilities that are aggregated as a result of integrating 
large networks is a complex issue. It is also a relatively new area of research to 
address these system-level vulnerabilities, because not many open source 
publications are available for review. As such, it seemed logical to start 
extrapolating the concept of security policy conflicts from a single network 
perspective to one that encompasses a larger scope, as highlighted in Figure 5. 
Using it as a framework to understand the types of vulnerabilities generated from 
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intra-network and inter-network conflicts, a vulnerability assessment methodology 
can be developed to address these vulnerabilities at the system level.  
With the current tools and techniques reviewed in the areas of network 
exploration, detecting authorized host and router connections, and vulnerability 
assessment, the next chapter will describe the proposed integrated approach 
model that will combine these “black-box” and “white-box” analysis tools and 
techniques in the context of detecting unauthorized connections by insider 
threats.   
 20
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III. AN INTEGRATED DETECTION MODEL 
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter presents the design of an integrated analysis model that 
combines both “black-box” and “white-box” approaches to conduct network 
exploration and vulnerability assessment in the context of detecting unauthorized 
host and router connections in the network infrastructure of a target system-of-
systems.  
B. OVERVIEW 
1. Recap of Problem Statement 
As military operations increasingly integrate large system-of-systems to 
develop cutting-edge operational capabilities, it will become more challenging to 
assess the overall security posture of the composite system-of-systems. New 
vulnerabilities may be introduced and insider threats may exploit these to 
establish unauthorized host and router connections.  
2. Strategy and Proposed Approach 
The proposed strategy is to leverage the complementary nature of “black-
box” and “white-box” analysis approaches to improve current detection 
capabilities and enhance the network integrity of large integrated systems-of-
systems. Key to the approach is a model to describe the structured process of a 
network exploration methodology. This methodology will prescribe how a network 
topology representation of a large integrated system-of-systems is mapped-out. 
Based on the network topology, the model will differentiate unauthorized 




vulnerability assessment to determine the overall security posture and security 
impact of such unauthorized connections on the modeled large system-of-
systems.  
3. Assumptions 
The methodology makes several assumptions regarding the networks to 
which the model will be applied. These include: 
a. There is no prior knowledge regarding the network topology. 
As such, the methodology is applicable to almost all scenarios. This is also to 
prevent outdated network information from potentially corrupting the network 
exploration process in the model.  
b. There exists a process (either via a trusted Network 
Administrator, databases, or the use of anomaly detection techniques) to 
determine off-line whether a given host, networking device, or network 
connection is authorized. 
4. Model Overview 
 
Figure 6.   Integrated Analysis Model 
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The analytical model, as shown in Figure 6, applies a structured approach 
to develop an integrated network exploration and vulnerability assessment 
methodology. The methodology is geared towards detecting unauthorized 
connections and providing a vulnerability-assessed network map as an output for 
evaluation, as described in the Chapter IV. With a set of predefined network 
exploration criteria that specifies the attributes of a network map, the model will 
adopt a modular approach to use relevant tools and techniques to combine 
“black-box” and “white-box” analyses. The modular approach provides flexibility 
in deciding which tools and techniques to use in the areas of active 
reconnaissance and network monitoring to conduct network mapping. It will also 
allow a network manager to keep the model current with the latest network 
exploration tools and techniques.  
With the network map constructed and essential network information 
(such as host information and networking protocols) annotated in the network 
map, the model will generate a list of suspicious network connections for more 
refined analysis. It will establish a process to query an authoritative entity to 
verify the network information annotated on the network map, differentiating 
authorized from unauthorized hosts and networking devices. With the list verified, 
the model will monitor real-time changes to the network map and use anomaly-
based detection techniques to monitor the traffic generated from this list. This is 
to highlight the unauthorized connections that can be attributed to insider attacks. 
Upon detection of these unauthorized connections, the model will use a 
prescribed set of criteria to conduct vulnerability assessment of the integrated 
system-of-systems. It will continue the modular approach, selecting tools and 
techniques from “black-box” and “white-box” analysis approaches. The model will 
generate a series of vulnerabilities and categorize them into Intra-network and 
Inter-network vulnerabilities to provide a “first-cut” perspective of a holistic 
vulnerability assessment of the network. The model will take a step further to 
determine the impact of unauthorized connections on the integrity of the 
defended network, which can provide a refined resolution of the vulnerabilities. At 
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the end of the modeling process, the model will produce a vulnerability-assessed 
network map of the defended network to aid the network monitoring 
functionalities of the network administrators and network security engineers. 
C. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO NETWORK EXPLORATION 
The model adopts an approach that integrates the strengths of “black-box” 
analysis and “white-box” analysis to conduct network exploration of the defended 
network. It involves identifying a set of network exploration criteria to determine 
the essential network information that the network map will display. It will also 
adopt a modular approach to select tools and techniques from the areas of Active 
Reconnaissance and Network Monitoring to provide essential network 
information from which to construct the network map. A correlation engine is 
used in the model to aid and validate the detection of unauthorized connections 
in the network map. The engine correlates the network information produced by 
each tool and technique, stores the correlated information in a database, and 
highlights those that have information disparity for further inspection.    
1. Network Exploration Criteria 
The set of network exploration criteria defines what network mapping 
capabilities the tools should have to build a network map. It also defines the type 
of network information that needs to be available on the network map to detect 
unauthorized connections and perform vulnerability assessment. The set of 
criteria identifies the metrics used to assess the completeness of the network 
map and its supportability for detecting unauthorized connections. The key 
consideration for developing the set of criteria is to have it focus on essential 
network information that will substantiate unauthorized connections, yet prevent 
the network map from being over-cluttered with unnecessary information when 
larger systems-of-systems are considered. The criteria are identified in Table 1. 
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S/No. Criteria Network Information 
1. Positive Identification of all available 
Host and Networking Devices 
Physical Topology = (Hosts and 
Networking Devices, Edges);  
Device Name and IP Address for 
Each Host or Networking Device 
2. Correct Type Identification of Host 
and Network Device  
Type = Unknown, Client, Server, 
Router, Switch or Firewall 
3. Accurate Confirmation of Host and 
Networking Device Status 
Availability Status = Unknown, 
Online or Offline 
4. Correct Identification of Operating 
System Type and Version 
OS = Windows XP Service Pack1, 
Ubuntu, IOS version 12.1, etc. 
5. Detection of Ports and Services  Port Number; Status = Active or 
Inactive 
6. Correct Inventory Accountability of 
Hosts and Networking Devices 
Number of Physical Hosts and 
Networking Devices in Network 
7. Detection of Unauthorized Hosts, 
Networking Devices, or Connections 
Security Status = Authorized or 
Unauthorized 
Table 1.   A Set of Defined Criteria for Modeling Network Exploration 
2. Incorporating Modularity in Model Design 
The model incorporates modularity to provide flexibility in design and 
support system extensions. As depicted in Figure 7, the model does not dictate a 
fixed set of tools or techniques to be used, but instead is designed to allow the 
latest network mapping tools and new techniques to be employed. This facilitates 
flexibility in building a comprehensive network map. Such a modular approach 
will also generate information disparities between each tool and technique, which 
is precisely what the model is intending to do. An example of such information 
disparity might be when two different network mapping tools have differing 
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findings on a host- or set of host-to-networking device connections. Information 
disparity may be used to trigger alerts for further inspection of the network for 
unauthorized connections, as described in a later section. 
 
Figure 7.   A Modular Design for Network Exploration 
In the event there are information gaps in the network map that go beyond 
the capabilities of the currently employed tools and techniques, the network 
manager may bring in more advanced tools and techniques in the future as they 
become available. Regardless, these information gaps serve as useful feedback 
to form a data repository for network administrators and network security 
engineers to identify specifically what they do not know at that specific moment 
about their network. This is a key consideration because it is a challenging task 
to keep pace with the network topology as it is constantly evolving. Precise 
identification of such information gaps will aid the network administrators in 
planning protection measures against the vulnerabilities. 
3. The Integrated Network Exploration  
The integrated network exploration will employ active reconnaissance 
tools to conduct a preliminary scan of the defended network, followed by using 
network-monitoring techniques to elicit more network information from networking 
devices detected during the reconnaissance activity. From the active 
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reconnaissance toolkit, the model will utilize various types of pings to scan the 
network. For example, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) pings may be 
used to detect the presence of active hosts on the network. As most firewalls are 
configured to block ICMP packets, Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) pings may be used to check if there are any SNMP-enabled devices on 
the network, which can provide network information such as Domain Name 
Server (DNS) name, system names, system types, and system descriptions. In 
addition, TCP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) pings may be used to 
determine if there are hosts that have their ports listening for connections, 
associated with well-known services (such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 
Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet, etc.). Since these techniques are only useful in 
detecting hosts and networking devices that provide responses, the network map 
is not complete as there may be hosts that may not reply to the pings.  
Network monitoring tools and techniques are used to derive network 
information from hosts and networking devices that are configured not to 
response to scanning. Typically, more network information is obtainable from 
networking devices, such as routers and switches. Routers and switches keep a 
record (such as a routing table) of neighboring networking devices, including 
connected hosts, so they know to which networking devices or hosts it can route 
or forward the received data traffic. Information that is relevant to network 
exploration includes the network identification, the IP address of neighbors, and 
interfaces of a host or networking device. The integrated network exploration 
model will correlate these two sets of network information to produce a network 
map with essential network information.  
4. Detection of Unauthorized Connections 
With the network map constructed for the defended network, the model 
will examine the correlated network information to discover any information 
disparity produced using the different tools and techniques. These disparities 
refer to the form of conflicting information, including IP addresses and the 
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number of hosts and networking devices on the network. These are useful 
indications regarding the false “positives” and false “negatives” generated by the 
integrated network exploration methodology. These may also be indications that 
unauthorized connections have been detected that require further verification.  
The model will use the network map as a basis to track changes to the 
topology, especially the ones that are newly connected and those that generated 
suspicious network traffic. It will first treat these new connections as unauthorized 
connections and employ a pattern-matching technique to differentiate the 
legitimate connections from those that are newly connected or unauthorized. To 
augment the decision on connections that are unauthorized, additional measures 
can be used to detect malicious traffic generated from these connections. 
However, this will be in the realm of an Intrusion Detection System. The model 
will highlight these suspicious or unauthorized connections and present the 
conflicting network information in the network map. 
D. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The approach to vulnerability assessment is similar to that of network 
exploration, whereby a suite of vulnerability assessment tools are selected based 
on their capabilities to determine network vulnerabilities. “Black-box” analysis 
tools such as Nessus, Retina and Core Impact provide comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment by scanning for known vulnerabilities on an unknown 
network. For example, Nessus uses a security vulnerability database and self-
written trusted binaries and detection signatures to detect specific vulnerabilities. 
Core Impact provides comprehensive information gathering through automated 
network discovery to provide the scope of the defended network, validates newly 
discovered vulnerabilities, and presents a centralized view of the network 
security posture. The conceptual idea behind this is to combine the findings from 
each of these tools to paint a comprehensive vulnerability assessment for the 
large defended system-of-systems. 
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Figure 8.   A Similar Modular Approach for Vulnerability Assessment 
The model will combine the vulnerability assessment reports generated by 
the “black-box” analysis tools with the reports produced by “white-box” analysis 
tools such as Orion Network Configuration Management (NCM) and Nagios, as 
the latter focuses on network configurations and connectivity. The combined 
knowledge may generate some intuition on how vulnerabilities are generated at 
the system level when a complex system-of-systems is integrated. It will help to 
attribute the generation of these vulnerabilities to either intra-network conflicts or 
inter-network conflicts. Specifically, the model will use this integrated approach to 
assess the security impact of unauthorized connections to the network. It will 
conduct this integrated vulnerability assessment to differentiate the “new” 
vulnerabilities when such unauthorized connections are discovered. 
In summary, the integrated approach to network exploration and 
vulnerability assessment aims at producing a network map that has been 
vulnerability-assessed using a combined suite of tools and techniques. As 
depicted in Figure 9, the generalized algorithm begins with a predefined set of 
criteria that defines the types of network information the tools and techniques 
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should discover so that the network map will not be over-cluttered with 
unnecessary information for detecting unauthorized connections and vulnerability 
assessment. A set of network reconnaissance tools will be selected and for each 
tool, network exploration will be done on the network with the discovered network 
information stored in a network information database. When the list of network 
reconnaissance tools are exhausted, a list of network monitoring tools will 
similarly be used to determine if there is more network information that has yet to 
be discovered by the network reconnaissance tools. New network information will 
be updated in the database. A list of “white-box” analysis queries will be 
determined to provide in-depth analysis of the network by complementing the 
“black-box” analysis in discovering hosts and networking devices that were not 
previously discovered. These nodes include hosts and networking devices that 
are either trivially inactive or more sophisticated in nature, where they are 
deliberately configured not to respond to pings. This additional network 
information is updated in the database. Until such time when the “white-box” 
analysis queries are exhausted, the correlated network information is retrieved 
from the database to construct a network map and stored separately in another 
database. 
In detecting unauthorized connections in the network, the constructed 
network map will be used to verify the list of hosts and networking devices that 
are detected by the integrated approach and are verified as authorized by the 
authoritative entity. In some situations, the network map is expected to contain 
more network information than what the authoritative entity may know, which are 
the authorized list of nodes, but he may not know what is actually deployed. 
Upon correlating the network map with the added information on the list of 
authorized nodes provided by the authoritative entity, the network map is used by 
the network administrators and security managers to monitor the network by 
tracking newly connected hosts and networking devices for unauthorized 
activities. Once suspicious activities are detected, these new connections will be  
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flagged as “suspicious”, from which the network administrators and security 
managers can further ascertain the vulnerabilities these suspicious connections 
introduced to the defended network. 
To determine the vulnerabilities introduced by suspicious connections, a 
list of “black-box” vulnerability assessment tools will be employed, followed by a 
series of “white-box” analysis queries to confirm the presence of additional 
vulnerabilities generated by these unauthorized connections. These newly 
discovered vulnerabilities will be stored in a vulnerability database as they serve 
as good reference for responsive recovery actions, which is outside the scope of 
this thesis.  
 
Figure 9.   Generalized Algorithm for the Integrated Approach 
With the integrated detection model developed, the next chapter 
discusses the results of implementing the algorithm, as described in Figure 9, on 
a test-bed to evaluate its effectiveness to conduct network exploration, detect 
unauthorized connections,  and conduct vulnerability assessment. 
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IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION  
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter describes the testing and evaluation of the integrated model 
introduced in the previous chapter for detecting unauthorized connections in 
networks. It documents the effort to implement the integrated model on a test bed 
and test its effectiveness in mapping the network, detecting unauthorized 
connections, and assessing the impact of such connections on network 
vulnerabilities. The evaluation is based on the comprehensiveness of the network 
information attainable from the test-bed according to the pre-defined set of 
criteria discussed in the previous chapter. The findings are compared against 
those achievable by current tools and techniques with the integrated “black-box” 
and “white-box” analysis approaches taken by the model to illustrate the security 
benefits of a combined approach. 
B. LAYING THE “GROUND WORK” 
A small network of systems is set up as a test-bed to implement and 
experiment with the integrated model for network exploration and vulnerability 
assessment. As depicted in Figure 10, the test-bed consists of a set of 
authorized hosts, servers and routers, and the network backbone to represent a 
network environment accessible through switch ports. Insider threats are 
simulated to have breached the physical security access and able to establish 
unauthorized network connections in the form of rogue host computers, routers, 
or wireless access points. These connections will be malicious in nature as they 
will be used to launch attacks that range from sniffing confidential information 
from the network, to generating large network traffic for denial of service attacks 
against legitimate users.  
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Figure 10.   A Simple Test Bed 
C. IMPLEMENT INTEGRATED NETWORK EXPLORATION 
The integrated model for network exploration and vulnerability 
assessment, as defined in Chapter III, is implemented as an algorithm that 
combines “black-box” and “white-box” tools and techniques. The collection of 
network information derived by the algorithm, and other key parameters, is 
defined as follows: 
Network Topology detectable by “Black-box” Analysis = (Vb, Eb)  
Network Topology derivable by “White-box” Analysis = (Vw, Ew)  
Authorized Topology G = (V, E)  
Actual Topology G’ = (V’, E’);   
where the first element of a tuple (e.g., Vb or Vw) represents the set of 
hosts and networking devices, and the second element the set of edges in 
the network.   
The algorithm is designed to attain as much network information as 
possible from the test-bed (G’ = (V’, E’)), using the set of pre-defined criteria to 
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determine what to gather for constructing the network map. The goal is to 
achieve an exact representation of the actual hosts and networking devices 
operating within the test-bed. This optimality criterion for the algorithm can be 
simply represented by the following condition: 
Vb U Vw = V’ and  Eb U Ew = E’ .                                                      
In general, the error of the algorithm can be modeled by a tuple variable ∆ 
such that 
Δ = {vi,ei| (vi  V’  vi  (VB  VW))  (vi V’  vi  (VB  VW)),  (ei 
E’  ei  (EB  EW))  (ei  E’  ei  (EB  EW)) }. 
1. Conduct Network Reconnaissance  
With the assumption that the algorithm has no prior network information 
regarding the test-bed, the “black-box” analysis tools and techniques are 
employed to provide a baseline network topology. This step, referred to as 
Network Reconnaissance, provides a quick first-cut view of hosts and networking 
devices operating on the network. These “live” nodes respond to the pings (traffic 
messages) sent out by the tools to elicit responses, and reply with their network 
information. Upon connection to the test-bed, the Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) configured for the network assigns an IP address to any new 
connection, and this IP address will determine the network address space in 
which pings can be launched to determine more network information, based on 
the set of pre-defined criteria that is needed to construct the network map. For 
example, if the DHCP client on the reconnaissance host receives the network 
address and mask 192.168.1.45/28, then the model launches the command 
‘nmap 192.168.1.33-46. In the test, the reconnaissance host receives a 
192.168.60.10, so the model launches Nmap, as depicted in Figure 11, to 
conduct a generic network scan to determine the number of “live” hosts on the 
network using the command “nmap 192.168.1-255.1-255”.  
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Figure 11.   Network Information Generated from Nmap 
The scan involves sending out ICMP Echo Request packets on the 
network and waiting for responses. Active hosts and networking devices that 
respond are then enumerated using “Synchronize (SYN) scans” on each of the 
TCP ports, 80 and 443, and are marked as “live” hosts on the network. Since 
ICMP pings are known to be blocked by patched systems, more advanced 
techniques, such as customizing TCP pings and ICMP messages, are needed to 
direct pings to specific well-known ports, such as Web servers (port 80), DHCP 
servers (port 67), and DNS servers (port 53) etc. Customizing these pings using 
commands like “nmap –sP –PS80 192.168.50.1/24” provide confidence that 
these ping packets are not dropped by firewalls protecting the hosts or servers.  
The command-line switch “-O -osscan-guess” is used to determine the 




vulnerabilities of the “live” hosts, but in this case it will serve as a source of 
network information that characterizes each host and networking device on the 
test-bed, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   Detailed Identification Information Provided by Nmap 
The proposed approach provides flexibility in the employment of network 
exploration tools (i.e. users can select other network exploration tools and/or 
techniques besides Nmap). This is to allow the network information attained by 
Nmap to be verified and validated by other tools within the integrated approach. 
The gathered network information will be stored in a data-structure, which will be 
used later to construct the network map of the test-bed. 
2. Employ Network Monitoring Tools for Mapping  
Network monitoring tools are employed, as they provide more 
comprehensive network information for known network devices to extend 
monitoring and management. Tools, such as LANsurveyor, provide network 
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mapping capability to accomplish their primary function of network monitoring 
and management. This particular tool accomplishes this by providing a graphical 
display of the network information garnished by sending Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) and ICMP Pings to the hosts on the test-bed, as 
shown in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13.   Network information from LANSurveyor 
The network information generated by these tools is useful for verifying 
the efforts of network reconnaissance even though the tools are more time-
consuming and not scalable for large networks, as compared to Network 
Reconnaissance tools. Table 2 provides a brief summary of what the “Black-box” 
analysis approach has gathered, with respect to the set of criteria defined in 
Chapter III for constructing the network map. 
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Table 2.   Information Attained from “Black-box” Analysis 
So far, the network information gathered by the “black-box” analysis 
approach, represented by (Vb, Eb), are hosts and networking devices that are 
operating openly on the network. It is not complete because it does not include 
hosts or networking devices that are not active on the network at the time of the 
scan. It has no details of the MAC addresses that can be used to associate the 
detected IP addresses to the physical hosts or networking devices. There is also 
no information on the connected-ness of each detected device. This information 
is critical for a Nodal Dependency Study—one that analyzes the edge 
dependency of each node or networking device so that the cascading effect of a 
node failure can be studied in detail to assess the level of redundancy of crucial 
required network resources, and thereby the robustness of the network. It is 
important that the network map is complete, as an undetected host may not have 
been online during the network discovery process or may in fact be a malicious 
device that an insider threat deliberately configured to evade detection and sniff 
confidential data silently off the network. In this case, the authorization level of 
the undetected host or networking device is unknown. 
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3. Query the Edge Routers in the Network 
A “white-box” analysis approach can gather network information about 
hosts that are not “live” on the network. This assumes that every connected host 
will have some form of signature or fingerprint captured in the form of a Media 
Access Control (MAC) address and an IP address. These information pieces are 
generally attainable from routers and switches deployed at the edge of the 
network, as they are essential for the routers and switches to either route or 
forward traffic from one host to another within the network. The process of 
gathering network information from these devices involves dedicated command-
line queries for which the routers and switches are required to respond with 
information that contributes to the purpose of network exploration. As depicted in 
Figure 14, the CISCO commands “show ip route” and “show arp” are used to 
display IP routing table and the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) table entries 
of the routers, respectively. 
 
Figure 14.   Network Information Provided by Router 
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4. Query the Switches Connected to Edge Routers  
As Layer-2 networking devices in the test-bed, switches provide the 
interface between routers and hosts that are connected to the network. They 
store useful network information about the connecting hosts so that they can 
forward the traffic data from the hosts to the routers, and vice versa. The network 
information useful for network exploration that can be gleaned from switches 
includes MAC addresses of all recently active connected hosts. The information 
gathering process involves using command-line queries such as “show usage 
utilization” and “show mac-address-table” to display the MAC addresses of the 
devices that are currently connected to the switch, and the utilization rate of each 
active port, respectively, as depicted in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.   Network Information Provided by Switch 
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5. Construct the Network Map 
By combining the network information from both the “black-box” and 
“white-box” analysis approaches, the network information gathered about the 
test-bed, represented by (Vb U Vw , Eb U Ew),  is complete. In this scenario, the 
information is perfect (i.e., ∆ = empty) as highlighted in Table 3.   
 
Table 3.   Combined Network Information Produced by Integrated Approach 
With the integrated approach, more network information data points are 
correlated and provide a more coherent network topology of the test-bed. IP 
addresses detected by the “Black-box” analysis tools for the same router with 
different network interfaces can be correlated based on the detailed verification 
by the “White-box” analysis approach. MAC addresses collected from querying 
each router provides coherent network information that points to the different 
MAC addresses of the network interfaces of a given router. The immediate 
neighbor of each networking device can be determined based on the network 
hop information using “black-box” analysis that is verified by the “white-box” 
analysis approach.  This information is useful for building a network map, similar 
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to Figure 9, to be used to query an authoritative entity (either a trusted 
Networked Systems Architect or Chief Network Administrator) to determine the 
list of authorized hosts and networking devices, represented by (V, E). This will 
support determination of disparities (i.e. Vb U Vw – V and Eb U Ew - E) that are 
used to detect the unauthorized devices.  
To summarize the efforts of combining “Black-box” and “White-box” 
analysis approaches, the algorithm to perform integrated network exploration of 
the test-bed is illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Algorithm for Integrated Network Exploration 
D. DETECT UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS 
The combined network information gathered from “black-box” and “white-
box” analysis approaches will serve as a baseline state to address the specific 
problem of detecting unauthorized connections in the test-bed. A process is 
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established whereby specific queries will be made to the authoritative entity to 
verify the list of authorized hosts and networking devices from the network map. 
The key to detecting unauthorized connections is the real-time correlation of new 
network information with that of the baseline state. A close monitoring capability 
of network anomalies generated from these correlations is necessary to ascertain 
if they are indeed unauthorized and malicious. 
1. Correlate and Track Changes to Network Map 
For the first test, a rogue host is connected to the switch to simulate that 
an unauthorized connection has been established. Attacks will be directed from 
this host to the network. It receives an assigned IP address of 192.168.60.10 
from the DHCP Server, which is a new piece of network information that deviates 
from the network map generated according to the algorithm discussed in the 
previous sections. As part of the real-time correlation process, such information 
disparities and deviations from the network map are tracked closely. At this point, 
all new connections that are not part of the network (i.e. host connections with 
network information not captured in the network map) will be treated as 
suspicious and annotated in the network map. The integrated model will also 
adopt an anomaly-based detection technique to determine if the traffic generated 
from these connections is malicious in nature (i.e., characterized by either a 
sudden surge in large packet transfer from these connections into the network or 
large flow of traffic directed from the network to these connections).  
2. Query Switch Ports Where Suspicious Hosts Are Connected 
Upon detection of malicious traffic on the network generated from these 
new connections, the model will query the switch port to which the suspicious 
host is connected, so that its traffic is immediately tracked for anomalies. 
Querying the switch port using the command “show interface Ethernet 0/19” will 
display the traffic activities on Ethernet port 19 including the amount of traffic the 
connecting host has sent or received from the network, as depicted in Figure 17. 
 45
Malicious traffic generated from the unauthorized hosts or networking devices 
show a sudden surge in the total number of frames in the receive and transmit 
statistics, indicating that an attack has being initiated from this port.  
 
Figure 17.   Information on Traffic Generated by Suspicious Host 
3. Employ NetFlow on Edge Router  
For a more detailed analysis of the traffic generated from this switch port, 
network administrators may employ the NetFlow [15] functionality that is resident 
in Cisco routers and switches. Cisco embedded a network monitoring 
instrumentation, called NetFlow, to help network administrators understand the 
behavior of traffic flow in the network. In the test-bed, the router (with IP Address  
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at 192.168.60.1) that is directly connected to the switch is configured to enable 
this functionality, This will generate a better understanding of the behavior of 
suspicious hosts connected to the switch.  
 
Figure 18.   Netflow Information on Unauthorized Connections 
Upon receiving a stream of packets from the switch sent by a suspicious 
host, the router will examine the packets to look out for a set of IP packet 
attributes. It will then group the packets with similar attributes into a flow that will 
be stored in a cache in the NetFlow-enabled router. This network information can 
be retrieved to display the set of IP packet attributes; but more important is the 
information regarding the amount of traffic to which the tallied packets and bytes 
correspond. This is because attacks usually generate an unusually high amount 
of traffic to consume the network resources to cause denial-of-services.  As 
shown in Figure 18, the command “show ip cache flow” is issued to display the 
amount of traffic generated and the corresponding destination IP addresses. It 
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may also reveal if traffic is routed to a particular destination that is not cleared for 
hosts that are publicly connected via a switch port.  Such information may be 
accumulated over time to identify the trend of attacks that do not occur 
immediately when the rouge device is connected. 
To summarize, the efforts of combining “black-box” and “white-box” 
analysis approaches for the detection of unauthorized connections is shown to 
be possible with a simulated attack against the test-bed. The network information 
for the unauthorized connection is summarized in Table 4. In this case, the 
integrated approach revealed that there are three unauthorized hosts connected 
to the network, of which one had its ports filtered. They were detected as their 
corresponding MAC addresses and IP addresses differed from the original, 
baseline network map, which flagged them as “suspicious” connections, following 
which the confirmation of suspicious traffic flagged as “unauthorized” 
connections. The algorithm to perform the integrated approach to detecting 
unauthorized connections is illustrated in Figure 19. 
 
Table 4.    Network Information On Unauthorized Connections  
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Figure 19.   Algorithm for Detecting Unauthorized Connections 
E. IMPLEMENT AN INTEGRATED VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The integrated model employs a similar technique in performing 
vulnerability assessment on the test-bed. That is, it leverages various tools and 
techniques from “black-box” and “white-box” approaches to give a coherent 
vulnerability assessment of the network map generated for the test-bed.  
1. Conduct Initial Intra-Network Vulnerability Assessment 
When the network map is first developed it is important to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment to determine the network’s baseline vulnerabilities. 
These vulnerabilities are categorized as Intra-Network Vulnerabilities, and must 
be patched before integrating with other networked systems. Thereafter, with 
each networked system integrated, another vulnerability assessment must be 
done at the system-interface level (i.e. where these systems are integrated).  In 
this test, an initial integrated vulnerability assessment was performed using 
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Nessus to detect vulnerabilities that can be exploited due to misconfigurations in 
the test-bed. The intra-network vulnerability assessment findings provided by 
Nessus are depicted in Figures 20. It provides an overview of the severity of the 
problems it has discovered for each host and networking device, and categorizes 
the vulnerabilities into three levels of severity. Nessus also provides a synopsis 
and the details of each vulnerability that are useful for network administrators to 
follow up and patch the system. 
 
Figure 20.   Report Generated by Nessus 
2. Determine Impact of Unauthorized Connections 
Upon detection of unauthorized connections in the test-bed, the impact of 
these connections on the network must be determined.  First, an assessment has 
to be performed on the detected unauthorized host or networking device as this 
will provide clues as to what vulnerabilities the unauthorized connections may 
introduce to the network. As depicted in Figure 21, Nessus is used to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment on the unauthorized host (with IP Address 
192.168.60.10) that shows the severity level of each discovered vulnerability and 
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the port information.  The overall network integrity of the defended network is re-
assessed to determine if such unauthorized connections have introduced more 
vulnerability in addition to what were previously patched in the initial assessment. 
Since Nessus provides a snapshot of the vulnerabilities, it discovered from the 
unauthorized connections that there is a need to query the connected router and 
switch to determine the activity level of the connections. The activity level, 
represented by the transmitted and received frames, will shed some light on 
whether new vulnerabilities are introduced. This is characterized by the sudden 
surge in data packets sent out from the connected switch and router. The 
algorithm for performing the integrated vulnerability assessment is illustrated in 
Figure 22. 
 
Figure 21.   Vulnerability Assessment on Unauthorized Host  
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Figure 22.   Algorithm for Vulnerability Assessment 
3. Summary—An Algorithm for Integrated Approach 
With the network map of the test-bed assessed by Nessus, the testing and 
evaluation of the integrated model was completed. In summary, the test-bed is 
successfully “explored” in the sense that a network map was generated with all 
connections, including the unauthorized connections. An initial vulnerability 
assessment was conducted to determine what needed to be patched before 
integration with other systems. The baseline network map was then used as a 
basis to detect unauthorized connections by detecting when changes were made 
to the topology. Upon detection of unauthorized connections, vulnerabilities 
induced by such connections were detected. With the vulnerability assessment 
completed, a vulnerability-assessed network map was generated, and was ready 
to be verified by an authoritative entity to confirm the findings of the integrated 
approach. Further security measures could then be taken by the system owners 
and network administrators to rectify the insider attacks.  
The above implementation of the integrated model has demonstrated that 
there are high payoff areas in combining “black-box” and “white-box” analysis 
approaches in terms of network exploration, detecting unauthorized connections, 
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and vulnerability assessment. The tests also showed that we can discover more 
network information and vulnerabilities using an integrated approach as 
compared to using such tools and techniques in isolation. The next chapter will 
conclude the findings of this thesis work and propose future work specifically in 




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter concludes the thesis work by reviewing the research 
questions it was set out to achieve answering with its work. The integrated 
approach of combining “black-box” and “white-box” analysis for network 
exploration and vulnerability assessment established a strong, fundamental 
foundation to address the security issue of detecting unauthorized connections in 
a defended network. There is research space for strengthening the concept of an 
integrated approach, which will be discussed as future work as follow-on efforts 
to this thesis work. 
B. CONCLUSION 
 The “black-box” and “white-box” analysis approaches were found to be 
complimentary for network exploration and vulnerability assessment. This is 
evident from the model design and experimental results from implementing the 
integrated model on the test bed. Two major observations supporting this 
conclusion are: 
1. In the network exploration phase, the “black-box” analysis approach 
was able to map out hosts and networking devices that are active in the test bed. 
Examples of hosts and networking devices that are not detectable by the “black-
box” analysis include those configured not to respond to pings, and those 
inactive but connected to the test bed. The “white-box” approach is 
complimentary to the “black-box” in the sense that it is able to query specific 
networking devices and traffic logs such as the Cisco NetFlow data to discover 
“inactive” hosts and networking devices. By issuing additional router or switch 
command line queries, such as “show interface,” “show ip route,” and “show arp,” 
one is able to the discover IP and MAC addresses of the hosts and networking 
devices not enumerated by the “black-box” analysis approach. 
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2. In detecting unauthorized connections, the “black-box” analysis 
approach can reveal specific IP addresses of suspicious hosts or networking 
devices by correlating network information. However, it cannot ascertain the 
nature of data traffic generated by these nodes, which is determining if the device 
activity is malicious. Nonetheless, these IP addresses served to guide the “white-
box” analysis to query switches and routers connected to these suspicious 
nodes. Using the embedded NetFlow functionality in CISCO routers and 
switches, the command “show ip cache flow” displays the amount of data traffic 
generated from these suspicious nodes, which may be further analyzed to 
confirm that they are indeed unauthorized connections. Thus, the integrated 
approach paved a way to address the problem of detecting unauthorized 
connections in large operational networks.  
This thesis work proposed a systematic way of combining “black-box” and 
“white-box” analysis approaches for network exploration and vulnerability 
assessment. It incorporates modularity in its design to leverage the strengths of 
open source tools and techniques to construct a network map to be used for 
detecting unauthorized connections, as confirmed either through off-line 
investigation or through an “intelligent oracle” that maintains the authorized 
topology, and assess the vulnerabilities that potentially may be introduced. 
Although not proven optimal, this systematic methodology demonstrated that 
there are high operational benefits garnered by combining the two analysis 
approaches. These include establishing a comprehensive network topology to 
serve as a baseline necessary to aid the network administrators and security 
managers, providing real-time detection of suspicious hosts and networking 
devices, and discovering potential vulnerabilities in the defended network.   
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Automating the Integrated Model for Network Exploration and 
Vulnerability Assessment 
This thesis work laid the steps by which the integrated model can be used 
for network exploration and vulnerability assessment, as shown in Figure 20. 
Using these steps to establish software requirements, follow-on work could 
develop an application program to automate these steps. Further, automation 
might be used to verify the methodology’s capabilities to conduct network 
mapping, detect unauthorized connections on the network map, and determine 
the impact of unauthorized connections on the defended network. The program 
should also maintain currency with respect to integrating the latest tools and 
techniques available to probe or monitor networks, thereby constantly improving 
its capability in detecting unauthorized connections. 
2. Evaluation of Algorithm on Large Operational Networks 
This thesis effort focused on developing an analytical approach to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the integrated approach of combining “black-box” 
and “white-box” analysis in network exploration, detecting unauthorized 
connections, and vulnerability assessment in a simple test-bed. There is a need 
to extend the thesis work to evaluate the integrated model in large operational 
networks, verifying its effectiveness in network exploration and vulnerability 
assessment in such contexts. This will provide a practical and realistic approach 
to further validate the results and findings of this thesis work, providing more 
visibility of the operational benefits to be secured by deploying this integrated 
model in network operations centers. 
3. In-depth Analysis on Detecting Unauthorized Connections 
Another possible area of future work is to refine the process of discovering 
and further qualifying connections as unauthorized in the defended network. This 
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can potentially take on the work of integrating an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) and embedding a behavior analysis capability into the model so that the 
integrated approach can evolve from a correlation engine to one that detects 
unauthorized connections primarily based on the behaviors of these connections. 
The enhanced system should be able to detect unauthorized connections even if 
these connections are camouflaged with spoofed IP and MAC addresses.  It 
could also extend its detection of unauthorized wireless access points, which 
remains a challenging issue today. Addressing security issues related to network 
exploration and vulnerability assessment of an unknown wireless network 
environment will leapfrog the current research in securing wireless 
communications for both military and civilian applications. 
4. Refining the Model Analysis Approach 
This study sought to establish the potential utility of integrating black-box 
and white-box analysis techniques to detect unauthorized network connections.  
While this was accomplished, the methodology used a simple sequential 
application of the two techniques, similar to the classic “Waterfall” process of 
software engineering.  However, as with managing software projects with less 
well understood requirements, a “spiral” methodology where iterative application 
of black-box and white-box techniques are applied to incrementally refine the 
network topology information may prove to hold benefit. When combined with 
automation of black-box and white-box tool application, a more thorough analysis 
of the network may be achieved. 
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